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Abstract
The performance of partially synchronous BFT-based consensus protocols is highly dependent on the primary node. All
participant nodes in the network are blocked until they receive a proposal from the primary node to begin the consensus process.
Therefore, an honest but slack node (with limited bandwidth) can adversely affect the performance when selected as primary. Hermes
decreases protocol dependency on the primary node and minimizes transmission delay induced by the slack primary while keeping
low message complexity and latency.
Hermes achieves these performance improvements by relaxing strong BFT agreement (safety) guarantees only for a specific
type of Byzantine faults (also called equivocated faults). Interestingly, we show that in Hermes equivocating by a Byzantine primary is
unlikely, expensive and ineffective. Therefore, the safety of Hermes is comparable to the general BFT consensus. We deployed and
tested Hermes on 190 Amazon EC2 instances. In these tests, Hermes’s performance was comparable to the state-of-the-art BFT
protocol for blockchains (when the network size is large) in the absence of slack nodes. Whereas, in the presence of slack nodes
Hermes outperformed the state-of-the-art BFT protocol by more than 4× in terms of throughput as well as 15× in terms of latency.
Index Terms
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1 Introduction
Scaling of a consensus protocol to support a large number of participants in the network is a desired feature. It not only allows
more participants to join the network but also improves decentralization [1]. Additionally, reliability of a consensus protocol also
depends on the actual number of faults it can tolerate [2], [3]. In a BFT-based (Byzantine Fault Tolerant) protocol if the total number
of participating nodes is n then the number of faults that can be tolerated is bounded by f <n/3 [4]. Therefore, to improve the fault
tolerance a scalable protocol has to be designed so that it can operate well with larger values of n. However, the increase in number
of nodes generally results in higher message complexity which adversely affects the BFT performance [5], [6], [7]. Recent works
have tried to address the scalability issues in the BFT protocols [8], [9], [10], [11], [12].
In BFT-based protocols the primary node acts as a serializer for requests. The consensus epoch begins as the primary proposes
request batch/block to nodes in the network. The epoch ends after nodes agree on a block and add it to their chain. In practice,
usually the size of the block proposed by the primary may range from several Kilobytes to several Megabytes. Therefore, by
increasing the number of participants/nodes in the network the primary node with limited bandwidth has to spend most of its time
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2broadcasting the block to a large number of nodes. Moreover, consensus nodes are blocked until they receive the proposal from the
primary. Inversely, a primary node will be blocked until it receives at least n−f responses from other nodes before proposing the
next block. By designing a protocol that shortens this blocking time, BFT-based consensus protocol performance can be improved.
The Hermes protocol design has two new elements. The first design element includes proposing a block to a subset of nodes
of size c and having a round of message exchange among this subset to make sure no request (block) equivocation has taken place
by the primary. This design element helps us to achieve two goals namely: (1) High performance despite slack primary nodes;
and (2) Efficient Optimistic Responsiveness. The second design element involves removing a round (phase) of message exchange
among all nodes (equivalent to first phase of PBFT) from happy case execution (normal mode) and adding a recovery step to
the view change mode. This design element helps Hermes to achieve design goal (3) Latency. In addition, we make use of a design
element in [13] in order to achieve design goal (4) Scalability. This element involves node communication through a subset of
nodes of size c also called the impetus committee.
Although the use of a committee to improve BFT performance has been done previously [13], [14], [15], [16], we use the impetus
committee for completely different design goals (1 through 3). Moreover, a novel combination of the above three design elements to
improve the overall BFT performance is something that to our best knowledge has not been done before.
Below we present key design goals of Hermes BFT that have pushed the performance to a next level especially for a blockchain
setup.
1: High performance despite slack primary nodes. Slack nodes are honest nodes that have lower upload bandwidth compared
to other nodes in the network. Lower upload bandwidth increases transmission delay (which is the time taken to put packets on the
wire/link). On the contrary, prompt nodes have higher upload bandwidth and have lower transmission delay. In normal BFT based
protocols [17], [18], [19] the primary has to broadcast a block to all nodes in the network of size n. Whereas in Hermes the primary
broadcasts a block only to a small subset of nodes of size c (also called impetus nodes). In Hermes the growth of c is sub-linear to n,
therefore increase in nwill not have significant impact on c, and hence on performance of Hermes. This leads to another interesting
property that we call Efficient Optimistic Responsiveness.
2: Efficient Optimistic Responsiveness. Responsiveness is an important property of BFT state machine replication (SMR)
protocols [20], [21]. In BFT SMR protocols with responsiveness the primary drives the protocol towards consensus in a time that
depends on actual message delay, regardless of any upper bound on message delivery [17], [20]. A protocol is optimistically
responsive if it achieves responsiveness when additional constrains are met. Hotsuff [17] is optimistically responsive in which the
primary has to wait forn−f responses to send next proposal. In Hermes during period of synchrony, a correct primary will only wait
for c/2+1 responses (lower than n−f responses) to propose next block that will make progress with high probability. After a round
of agreement these c nodes (also called impetus committee) if agreed, will forward the proposed block to all nodes in the network. In
case of Hermes, conditions for optimistic responsiveness include receipt of c/2+1 responses by the primary. For different values of c
3chosen in our experiments in Section 7 the probability of having at least one prompt node among a subset of size c is approximately
1−10−9 (when the number of prompt nodes are at least f+1). This means that with high probability there will be at least one
prompt node in the impetus committee that can forward the block to the regular nodes efficiently. Therefore we call Hermes efficient
optimistic responsive as messages in Hermes propagate to nodes with the wire speed comparable to the wire speed of prompt nodes.
3: Latency. BFT-based protocols [5], [11], [22] generally operate in two phases (excluding Pre−prepare phase). In the first phase
each node receives 2f+1 responses before moving to the second phase. The first phase has two objectives. First, it guarantees that
the request is unique. We achieve this objective in Hermes with high probability through message exchange among a small subset
of nodes of size c in Pre−Proposal phase shown in Figure 1. Second, it guarantees that if a request is committed in the second
phase by at least one node just before a view change, all other correct nodes will eventually commit this request. This means for
Hermes the second objective of the first phase is only necessary when there is a view change. To save broadcast and processing
latency (while achieving second objective), we remove this phase from happy case mode and instead add an additional recovery
phase to view change sub protocol in Hermes.
4: Scalability. Hermes is using the impetus committee to maintain performance in the presence of a slack primary and achieve
efficient optimistic responsiveness. Therefore, the same impetus committee can be leveraged to improve message complexity
as done in Proteus [13]. Thus, we extend a single round of broadcast message where each node receives n−f responses before
committing a block into Proposal, Confirm and Approval phases (as show in Figure 1). This reduces the message complexity
fromO(n2) toO(cn).
The trade-off for improvements in Hermes is a relaxed safety guarantee (R-safety) in the presence of equivocated faults in which
a Byzantine primary proposes multiple blocks for the same height just before a view change. Informally, R-safety can be defined as a
block will never be revoked if it is committed by at least 2f+1 nodes or f+1 correct (honest) nodes. Whereas in Strong safety
(S-safety) a block will never be revoked if it is committed by at least one correct node. Strong safety will not hold in the presence of
equivocated faults. By making equivocation difficult we increase the likelihood of Hermes to be S-safe. Moreover we also show that
the equivocation faults will not have any affect on clients. That means if a client receives commit approval for a transaction from
network, then that transaction will never be revoked. Therefore, the main purpose of equivocation which is double spending attack
is not possible. The only side affect of the equivocation faults is the network recovery cost from failure. We also show that due to
the design of Hermes, equivocating faults are unlikely (the primary as well as the majority of the nodes in the impetus committee
have to be Byzantine) and expensive for Byzantine primary and its acquaintances in the impetus committee (the primary as well as
the Byzantine nodes in the impetus committee that have signed for two different blocks at the same height will lose their stake in
the network or can be blacklisted). Therefore, a Byzantine primary finds equivocation unlikely, expensive and has no incentive to
perform it.
Paper Outline. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give our system model and definitions. In Section 3 we
4Fig. 1: Message pattern in each phase of normal mode in Hermes BFT
present the overview of the Hermes protocol. Section 4 provides a detailed operation of Hermes protocol. Proof of correctness
for Hermes appears in Section 5 and in Section 6 we describe Efficient Optimistic Responsiveness as protocol optimization. Section
7 contains the experimental analysis and in Section 8 we present related work . We conclude our work in Section 9.
2 Definitions andModel
Hermes operates under Byzantine fault model. Byzantine faults include but not limited to hardware failures, software bugs, and
other malicious behavior. Our protocol can tolerate up to f Byzantine nodes where the total number of nodes in the network is n
such that n=3f+1. The nodes that follow the protocol are referred to as correct nodes. In this model there can be up to f number
of slack nodes (ns≤f , where ns is total number of slack nodes ).
Hermes is a permissioned blockchain. In permissioned blockchain nodes in the network are known to each other and have
access to each other’s public key. In permissioned blockchains nodes can join the network through an access control list. In this
model nodes are not able to break encryption, signatures and collision resistant hashes. We assume that all messages exchanged
among nodes are signed. A messagem′ signed by the node i is denoted by 〈m′〉i, a messagem′ with aggregated signature from
impetus committee quorum (of size bc/2c+1) is denoted by 〈m′〉σr , a messagem′ with aggregated signature from regular node
quorum (of size 2f+1) is denoted by 〈m′〉σ, and a messagem′ with aggregated signature from view change quorum (of size f+1)
is denoted by 〈m′〉σv .
As a state machine replication service Hermes needs to satisfy following properties.
Definition 1 (Relaxed Safety). A protocol is R-safe against all Byzantine faults if the following statement holds: in the presence of dn/3e−1
Byzantine nodes, if b2n/3c nodes or bn/3c correct nodes commit a block at the sequence (blockchain height) s, then no other block will ever be
committed at the sequence s.
Definition 2 (Strong Safety). A protocol is S-safe if the following statement holds: in the presence of dn/3e−1 Byzantine nodes, if a single
correct node commits a block at the sequence (blockchain height) s, then no other block will ever be committed at the sequence s.
Definition 3 (Liveness). A protocol is alive if it guarantees progress in the presence of at most dn/3e−1 Byzantine nodes.
5Hermes guarantees liveness, R-safety as well as probabilistic S-safety. Liveness is achieved in asynchronous network by placing
an upper bound on block generation time called timeout. Epoch identifies a period of time during which a block is generated.
Each epoch can be associated with specific sequence or height of blockchain. Once a node receives a block it stops the timer for the
expected block and starts its timer for the next block it is expecting from the impetus committee.
For ease of understanding first we describe and prove correctness of the basic Hermes protocol in which the primary proposes
the next block once the current proposed block is committed. Then in Section 6 we discuss how Hermes can be optimized so that
the primary can propose next block once it collects at least bc/2c+1 responses from the impetus committee (Efficient Optimistic
Responsiveness).
3 Protocol Overview
In Hermes, the primary proposes a block to the impetus committee of size c. The impetus committee is running an agreement
phase based algorithm (Algorithm 1). If bc/2c+1 impetus committee nodes agree on the block proposed by the primary and 2f+1
regular nodes agree on the proposed block (which they received from the impetus committee), then the block is committed locally
by a node and will be added to the blockchain. During normal execution of Hermes we use the same name for a message and
its respective phase.
Normal execution of the protocol is shown in Figure 1 and can be summarized as follows:
1) The primary proposes the block (which contains transactions send by clients) to the impetus committee (Pre-Prepare
message).
2) Each impetus committee member verifies the block and makes sure that there is only one block proposed for the expected
height (by collecting signatures from at least bc/2c+1 impetus committee members through Pre-Proposal messages).
3) The block is then proposed using the Proposal message which includes primary signature along with bc/2c+1 aggregated
signatures of impetus committee members from Pre-Proposal messages.
4) Upon receipt of a block, regular nodes verify the aggregated signature and the transactions within the block.
5) If the block is found to be valid, each regular node responds with the signedConfirmmessage.
6) Upon receipt of 2f+1Confirmmessages from regular nodes, each impetus committee member as well as the primary
commits the block. Each member of the impetus committee broadcasts approval of the majority nodes in the form of 2f+1
aggregated signatures from regular nodes inApproval message.
7) Upon receipt of approval, each regular node commits the block, which is then added to the local history.
8) After committing locally, each node sends aReply message to the client. The client considers its transaction to be committed
upon receipt of 2f+1Reply messages (or f+1 similarReply messages).
9) Soon after committing a block the primary begins the next epoch (messages are shown in blue) and proposes a new block
6to the impetus committee using Pre-Preparemessage. The impetus committee members begin the Pre-Proposal phase
and the protocol progresses through each of its phases as described above.
3.1 Accountability
To discourage malicious primary as well as impetus committee nodes from equivocation, Hermes nodes will have to provide
a fixed amount of stake while joining the network as done in Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocols [19], [23]. But this amount will be
equal for every participant in the network. Since every participant has equal stake therefore the probability of being selected as
primary node or member of the impetus committee is same for every node. Alternatively, any node involved in equivocation
can be blacklisted in the network.
3.2 Selecting Impetus CommitteeMembers
Consider a set of n nodes and letN ={i| 1≤i≤n} be their unique node ids, which for simplicity are assumed to be taken between
1 and n. Since all nodes are regular,N also denotes the set of regular nodes. Suppose that out of the n nodes at most f are faulty
such that f <n/3; actually, we will assume the worst case n=3f+1.
Let C⊂N denote the set of nodes in the impetus committee, such that |C|=c, where cn is a predetermined number that
specifies the size of the impetus committee (from now on C and impetus committee will be used interchangeably in the paper). The
impetus committee C is formed by randomly and uniformly picking a set of c nodes out of n. In addition to the impetus committee
members, there is a primary node picked randomly and uniformly out of the remaining n−c nodes.
Since f <n/3, therefore on expectation, the impetus committee will have less than c/3 faulty nodes. Hence, C will likely have
less than c/2 faulty nodes as well. Nevertheless, as the members of C are randomly picked, having c/2 or more faulty nodes in C are
at long odds.
Moreover, the primary might be faulty as well. However, a view change can address primary as well as impetus committee
failure. We carry on with analysis to precisely determine the likelihood of different scenarios for picking the members in C. In the
formation of C the number of possible ways to pick any specific set of c nodes out of n is (nc). The probability to pick exactly a
correct nodes and b faulty nodes in C, such that a+b= c, is (
n−f
a )(
f
b)
(nc)
. Therefore, the probability Pf of having at least c/2 faulty
nodes (b≥c/2) in C will be:
Pf =
c∑
b=dc/2e
(n−f
a
)(f
b
)(n
c
) . (1)
If C is unable to generate a block by the end of timeout period, then C is replaced by another randomly chosen committee and a
new primary through view change.
View Change Probability.
View change can be triggered either by the failure of impetus committee C or failure of a primary. More specifically the two cases
7Algorithm 1: Algorithm for primary node
1 if i is primary then
2 if There is β from previous view then
3 if i has the payloadm for β then
4 Generate blockB from β with payloadm
5 end
6 else
7 Request Proposal for β from C
8 upon Receipt of Proposal do
9 Generate blockB from payloadm in Proposal
10 end
11 upon Receipt of 2f+1 negative response do
12 Generate blockB and also attach 2f+1 negative responses for β
13 end
14 end
15 end
16 else
17 Generate blockB
18 end
19 BroadcastB to the set C // Pre-Prepare
20 end
21 upon receipt of 2f+1 validConfirmmessages do
// Commit block and increment height
22 ψi(B,s)←true
23 s=s+1
24 SendResponse to clients
25 end
that can ultimately result in a view change are: (i) b≥c/2, where b is the number of faulty nodes in C (this comes with probability
Pf ), or (ii) when b<c/2 and the primary node is faulty. For the latter case ii, since we choose the primary randomly from n−c nodes
if the total number of faulty nodes is f <n/3, then the probability of primary being faulty is at most (f−b)/(n−c)<n/(3(n−c));
hence, the probability that case ii occurs is less than n(1−Pf)/(3(n−c)). Therefore, the probability Pv of having view change due
to case i or ii is bounded by Pv<n(1−Pf)/(3(n−c))+Pf . Since Pf is approaching 0 and nc, the upper bound of probability
Pv can be approximated by 1/3 asymptotically to the limit of n.
Probability of At Least One Correct Node in C.For a view change to be initiated, it requires at least one correct node in C. In
the worse case, all the nodes in C are faulty, namely, b=c; this is the total failure scenario that does not allow view changes.
We observe that the probability of not having any correct node in C for different values of n and c in our experiments is at
most 3.8×10−22. Consequently, the probability of avoiding total failure is extremely high.
4 The Protocol
The basic operation of our protocol, Hermes, is presented in Algorithms 1, 2, and 4, which describe the normal execution between
the impetus committee C and regular nodes. Algorithm 3 is executed by synchronization sub-protocol. If normal execution fails,
then our protocol switches to view change mode executing Algorithms 5, 6 and 7 to recover from failure. Note that the members
of C and the primary also run themselves the protocols for regular nodes in normal mode.
8Algorithm 2: Node i∈C
1 upon receipt of validB do
2 Broadcast Pre-Proposal message to C
3 end
4 upon receipt of bc/2c+1 valid Pre-Proposal messages forB do
5 Build the Proposal
6 Broadcast the Proposal message to regular nodes (except the primary)
7 Send β to the primary
8 end
9 check always for receipt of a valid Γj from regular node j or Γp from primary then
10 Execute Algorithm 3
11 end
12 check always for for Γp response then
13 Forward the response to the primary
14 end
15 if not receivedB by block timeout then
16 Broadcast Γi to regular nodes
17 Accept messages from regular nodes to synchronize local history
18 end
19 upon receipt of 2f+1 validConfirmmessages do
20 ψi(B,s)←true
21 BroadcastApproval message
22 SendResponse to clients
23 end
24 check always for Receipt of firstConfV before receiving Proof then
25 BroadcastConfV
26 end
27 check always for detecting proof of maliciousness:E complaint or f+1 Γ complaints then
28 Broadcast proof
29 end
30 check always for Receipt of 2f+1 ConfV for the view change then
31 Do not send Pre-Proposal/Confirm message anymore for this view
32 BuildApproveV from 2f+1 ConfV messages
33 Broadcast theApproveV to regular nodes
34 end
4.1 Happy Case Execution
The currently designated primary node p proposes a block by broadcasting a Pre-Preparemessage to C (Algorithm 1, lines 1-9).
A Pre-Prepare message from primary p sends a newly created block B=(〈“Pre-Prepare”,v,s,h,d,o〉p,m) which contains the
view number v, block sequence number s, transaction listm, its hash h, the previous blockhash d and optional field owhich can be
used by the primary to send the proof 2f+1 of negative responses (F ) during first epoch of its view (new primary in its first epoch
might request the latest Proposal from the previous view. If replicas do not have the Proposal they will send negative response F ).
More details about this can be found in the subsection 4.3. Let ρ=〈“Pre-Prepare”,v,s,h,d〉p.
A node i in C begins Pre-Proposal phase of the algorithm after receipt of a Pre-Preparemessage. Then, node i broadcasts
a Pre-Proposal message 〈“Pre-Proposal”,v,s,h,i〉i if it finds the Pre-Prepare message to be valid. The validity check of the
Pre-Prepare message includes checking the validity of s, v, d, h and transactions inside m (Algorithm 2, lines 1-3). If node i
receives bc/2c+1 Pre-Proposal messages from other members of C for blockB then the node iwill successfully create a proposal
block (〈“Proposal”,v,s,h,d〉σr ,B). This proposal block can be compressed into (〈“Proposal”,ρ〉σr ,m) and then node i will
9broadcast it to the regular committee members; σr aggregates the signatures of the bc/2c+1 members of C that contributed to the
Proposal. Let β=〈“Proposal”,ρ〉σr since the primary already has the payloadm (from blockB it already proposed), the impetus
committee member iwill only forward β to the primary instead of sending the whole Proposal (Algorithm 2 lines 4−8).
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Upon receipt of a Proposal message from C, the regular nodes check if it is signed by at least bc/2c+1 members of C. Regular
nodes also verify the block by performing format checks and verification of each transaction against their history. If verification is
successful, a regular node j sends back a signedConfirmmessage 〈“Confirm”,v,s,h,j〉j to C (4, lines 1-4). The confirmation of a
blockB at height s by a node j is denoted by ηj(B,s)←true.
Each member i of C aggregates 2f+1 signatures σ forConfirmmessages and then commits the block locally (ψi(B,s) is used
to show commit of a block B by a node i at the height s). The node i then broadcasts Approval message 〈“Approval”,v,s,h〉σ
to regular nodes. Each member i of C will also send the Response message (〈Response,s,v,r,t,i〉i) to each client confirming
the execution of the respective transaction (with the timestamp t that the client submitted the transaction and its result r) that it
contributed to the blockB (Algorithms 1, lines 21-25 and Algorithm 2 lines 19−23). Upon receipt of a validApprovalmessage from
C (for the current block in the sequence), the regular member k also commits the block (ψk(B,s)←true) as shown in Algorithm 4,
lines 12-21. Each node k (after committing the block) also sends aResponsemessage as shown in Algorithm 4 line 22.
4.2 Synchronization Sub-Protocol
The impetus committee C might be faulty, when it has c/2 or more faulty nodes (shown in red in Figures 2, 3, 4). In such a case,
the faulty members of C might attempt to not update ζ≤f regular nodes without triggering view change; namely, not sending
Proposal and other messages to the ζ nodes. (In the upper bound of ζ, f may include at most dc/2e−1 failed members of C.) These
ζ nodes (shown in yellow in Figure 2) may not be participating in the consensus process as they have not received messages from
members of C (as majority of C have failed). Therefore, they will need to sync their history (download messages) with other nodes.
Suppose that node j is a regular node that needs to be synchronized (j∈ζ) (download missing blocks).
Let i be a member of C such that i has received a timeout complaint Γj=〈“Timeout”,v,s′,h′,s′′,h′′,τ,j,〉j mentioning that j has
not received blocks between the sequences s′ and s′′ with respective hashes h′ and h′′. The fields s′′ and h′′ are optional and if node
j has not received any block after the block at sequence s′ then Γj=〈“Timeout”,v,s′,h′,τ,j,〉j. The message type τ shows which
type of message is missing, e.g. a block, an aggregated view change messageQ (will be discussed along with other message types in
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Algorithm 3: Synchronization sub Protocol for node e
input :Γ
1 if e∈C then
// If primary requests Proposal from previous view
2 if Γp then
3 if have Proposal for Γp then
4 Send Proposal to the Primary
5 end
6 else
// Send negative response
7 Send F to primary
8 Forward Γp to regular nodes
9 end
10 end
11 if Γj & j 6∈C then
12 Update j up to latest locally known block
13 end
14 end
15 else
16 if Γi & i∈C then
17 Send missing blocks to committee member i
18 end
19 if Γp then
20 if have Proposal then
21 Send Proposal to C
22 end
23 else
24 Send F to primary
25 end
26 end
27 end
subsection 4.3). The view number v identifies the primary. If node i has not sent a blockB? to the same node j earlier such that its
sequence s?≥s′or s?≥s′′ (validity condition for Γj), then the node iwill forward missing messages for missing blocks as shown in
Figure 4.
If node i times-out without receiving a valid expected message during the consensus process (as shown in the Figure 2) it will
broadcast a complaint Γi to regular nodes. Consequently, a node i in C can recover a block by receiving it from regular nodes
(as shown in the Figure 3). Thus, members of C and regular nodes synchronize their history (download missing blocks from each
other) while keeping message complexity low (avoid quadratic message complexity).
When a new primary is elected it has to make sure that if a block is committed by at least a single correct node then it should be
committed by at least 2f+1 nodes before proposing new blocks. Γp=〈“Timeout”,v′,β〉p is a specific type of timeout complaint by
the new primary to request the latest uncommittedProposal (actually the payloadm for β) from previous view. v′ denotes the view
of the current primary. A negative response from 2f+1 nodes for Γp request will prove that this Proposal has not been committed
by any node. If the primary receives a response for Γp it will re-propose the block. Thus, this additional recovery step after view
change makes sure that safety is held after the view change. More details about the Γp will be discussed in the subsection 4.3.
Algorithm 3 is about synchronization sub-protocol. Lines 1-14 are executed if the node is a member of the impetus committee.
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Algorithm 4: Regular node k
1 upon receipt of valid Proposal (valid β if k is also primary) from C do
// Confirm proposal
2 ηj(B,s)←true
3 GenerateConfirmmessage and broadcast it to C
4 end
5 if timeout for a block or receipt of invalid block then
6 Broadcast Γ‖E complaint to C
7 if sequence number of block is out of order then
8 Store the block locally and wait to fill the history gap
9 end
10 end
11 upon receiptApproval message do
12 if k∈C or k is primary then
13 ignore
14 end
15 else
16 Wait if any blocks were missing from sequence
17 foreach ordered block do
// Commit the block at height s
18 ψk(B,s)←true
19 s=s+1
20 end
21 SendResponse to clients
22 end
23 end
24 check always for receipt of a valid Γi‖Γp from i∈C then
25 Execute Algorithm 3
26 end
// Initiate view change actions
27 check always for Receipt of Proof ‖ConfV then
28 BroadcastConfV to C
29 end
30 check always for Receipt of a validApproveV for view change then
// Transition to new view, based on common random number generation seed
31 Randomly select members of C fromN
32 if k is not primary then
33 Execute Algorithm 5 ‖Algorithm 6
34 else
35 Execute Algorithm 7
36 end
37 end
In lines 1-10 node e responds to the Γp request from primary node. After sending the negative response to the primary, node e
forwards Γp to regular nodes (Algorithm 3 line 8). In lines 11-13, the impetus committee member e responds to the request of a
regular node j by sending the missing blocks to the node j. Lines 15-27 are executed if node e is not a member of the impetus
committee. In lines 16-18, node e responds to an impetus member request/complaint Γi. In lines 19-26, node e responds to request
Γp from the primary node.
The primary node might be malicious which can cause the impetus committee C to fail by not proposing a block. Another
possible cause of failure can be the presence of majority of malicious nodes in C. As a result, impetus committee nodes cannot collect
at least c/2+1 signatures for proposed block. In a rare case, it is also possible that both the primary and the impetus committee C
fail; in such a case the primary can collude with the C to perform block equivocation. The failure can be detected if f+1 nodes send
12
timeout complaint or a single node sends a complaint for equivocation by the primary and 2f+1 nodes receive it. Upon detecting
failure, Hermes will switch to view change mode to select new primary and impetus committee.
4.3 View Change
The view change sub protocol in Hermes is different from conventional BFT-based protocols as it has additional recovery phase to
make sure if a block is committed by a single node just before view change, then it will be committed eventually by all other correct
nodes. A view change can be triggered if there is sufficient proof of maliciousness of the primary or the impetus committee. The two
types of complaint by a node i that can form a proof against the Byzantine primary are the Γ complaints (as discussed in subsection
4.2) as well asE=〈“Explicit-complaint”,v,,i〉i complaint, where  determines the reason for the complaint which can be either
an invalid block Proposal or multiple Proposals by the primary and/or C with the same sequence number. A Proof is simply
formed by f+1 valid Γ complaints or a single validE complaint. A single valid Proof is required to trigger a view change.
During each epoch, a regular node waits to receive a proposed block from C. If a regular node i does not receive the block
after a timeout then it considers that C has failed and reports this to C (Algorithm 4, lines 5-6). If f+1 nodes report a timeout,
then there is at least one correct C member j that will broadcast the aggregated f+1 timeout complaints (Γ) to all regular nodes
(as Proof in Algorithm 2, lines 27-29). Upon receipt of f +1 Γ complaints the regular nodes send back confirm view change
(〈“ConfV ”,〈v,j〉j,〈Proof〉σv〉) message to C, where σv is the aggregated signature from at least f+1 complaints from Γ messages
(Algorithm 4, line 23-25). If complaint is of typeE then the confirm view will be of the form (〈“ConfV ”,〈v,j〉j,〈Proof〉i〉), where
the node iwill be the node that has complained. If an impetus committee member receives aConfV message and was not aware
of the Proof (therefore did not broadcast it to the regular nodes), it will also broadcast theConfV to the regular nodes (Algorithm
2 line 24-25). This step is added to prevent a Byzantine member in C from triggering the view change in a subset of regular nodes by
sending the Proof messages to few regular nodes.
Once a member i in C receives 2f + 1 ConfV messages, then i triggers view change by broadcasting message
(〈“ApproveV ”, 〈v〉σ, 〈Proof〉σv , 〈i〉i, 〉) to all regular nodes (Algorithm 2, lines 30-34). Where 〈v〉σ is the aggregate signature
for 2f+1 〈v,j〉j fromConfV messages sent by a regular node j. Upon receipt of theApproveV message each regular node will
begin the view change process (Algorithm 4, lines 26-33). In the view change, members of new impetus committee C along with
a new primary is selected by each node using a pre-specified common seed for pseudo-random number generation [24], which
guarantees that every node selects the identical C and primary. In pseudo-random generator algorithms, a random result can be
reproduced using the same seed. For example the count for the epoch trial can be considered as input seed. Count for epoch trial is
the total number of successful epochs that generated blocks plus total number of failed epochs that resulted in view change. In
Hermes the main requirements for random generator include liveness, bias-resistance and public verifiability or determinism. By
using the count for epoch trials as a seed for the the Pseudo-random generator we can satisfy the above mentioned requirements.
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There are other options like Verifiable Random Functions [25], [26] which can also be used in order to provide stronger guarantees
like unpredictability.
After randomly choosing the new primary as well as the new impetus committee C, each node sends a V iewChangemessage
Vk=(〈“V iewChange”,v+1,s′,h,k〉k,σ,β) to the new primary (Algorithm 5 line 1). The V iewChangemessage has information
about the latest block in the local history of the node k (Approvemessage can be built from Vk). It includes the latest committed
block sequence number s′, block hash h, incremented view number v+1, and signature evidence of at least 2f+1 (σ) nodes that
have confirmed the block (throughConfirmmessage). The β part of this message includes the latest Proposal and its respective
Pre-Prepare message from the last primary (without its payload m) which was received by the node k from C (through block
Proposal message). The inclusion of β in the view change message is used to recover the block (transactions) if less than f+1
correct nodes have committed the block. We will discuss more about this at the end of the current section. The information in Vk
is used to determine whether nodes have different local histories, which in turn can allow them to synchronize their histories by
getting the possible missing blocks from the new members of C. Upon receipt of Vk from node k, the new primary extracts the parts
h (hash of the latest committed block), s′, and k and also checks the validity of σ and β. Out of the 2f+1 nodes that contribute to σ,
it is guaranteed that at least f+1 are correct nodes and at least one out of these f+1 correct nodes has the latest block.
This guarantee is sufficient to generate next blocks in the new epoch on the top of the latest block.
The new primary, once it receives 2f+1 Vk messages it aggregates them intoQwhich it broadcasts to members of C (Algorithm
7, lines 1-6) and then C will broadcast the message Q to all nodes (Algorithm 6). Upon receipt of Q, node k makes sure that
its history matches with the history in Q (agreed by at least f +1 nodes) and if it does, node k sends back a Ready message
Rk=〈“Ready”,v+1,s′,h,k〉k to the new primary (Algorithm 5, lines 2-8). The primary will aggregate 2f+1Ready responses into
a single P message and broadcast it to C (Algorithm 7, lines 11-16) which will be forwarded to all the nodes (Algorithm 6). Upon
receipt of P , node k is now ready to take part in new view (Algorithm 5, lines 9-12). If node k’s history does not match that ofQ it
will synchronize its history (Algorithm 5, lines 4-6).
Recovery During View Change.
Recall that we add a recovery phase to the view change in order to significantly reduce the latency. During this recovery phase,
Hermes protocol makes sure that if there is any block that has been committed by at least one node, it will be committed by all
correct nodes eventually. If there is β in Vk∈Q, then the new primary has to propose the respective blockB for the β. If the new
primary has already received the Proposal or the block B for β it will re-propose it in the first epoch of its view. On the other
hand, if the new primary does not have the complete Proposal (including its payload m) for β it will request it from C using a
Γp complaint. If an impetus committee member e has the Proposal (payloadm) it will send it back to the primary. If not, it will
forward the Γp complaint to the regular nodes as well as sending a negative response F=〈β,false〉e to the primary (Algorithm 3,
lines 1-10). Regular nodes will also send back the Proposal message for β if they have it to the impetus committee (which will
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Algorithm 5: View change for regular node k
1 Send local history Vk to new primary
2 upon receipt of a validQmessage from a new committee member i do
3 Extract the most recent valid history fromQ
4 if local history is not same as most recent history inQ then
5 Synchronize local history according toQ
6 end
7 Broadcast READY message (Rk) to new primary
8 end
9 check always for receipt of P from i∈C then
10 if P has at least 2f+1 distinct READYmessages then
11 return to Algorithm 4
12 end
13 end
14 check always for Γi where i∈C then
15 Execute Algorithm 3
16 end
Algorithm 6: View change for node i∈C
1 if i∈C then
2 check always for (Q‖P) from primary then
3 Forward (Q‖P) to regular nodes
4 if P has at least 2f+1 distinct READYmessages then
5 return to Algorithm 2
6 end
7 end
8 end
9 check always for Γj where j 6∈C then
10 Execute Algorithm 3
11 end
Algorithm 7: View change for new primary
1 upon receipt of Vi from node i do
2 Q←Q∪Vi
3 ifQ contains at least 2f+1 histories then
4 BroadcastQ to C
5 end
6 end
7 Extract the most recent valid history
8 if local history is different from most recent history then
9 Synchronize local history Vi according to theQ from regular nodes
10 end
11 check always for receipt ofRi then
12 P←P∪Ri
13 if P has accumulated at least 2f+1 distinct READYmessages then
14 Broadcast P to members of C
15 end
16 end
17 check always for history update request from regular node i then
18 if node j has the latest history/block and has not already sent it to i then
19 Send the blocks up to the latest block to regular node i
20 end
21 end
22 Return to Algorithm 1
forward it to the primary) or a negative response F to the primary. If the primary receives back the Proposal it will re-propose the
block else it will have to propose another block with 2f+1 aggregated signatures for negative response F being attached to it in
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order to prove that Proposal for β was not committed by any correct node (Algorithm 1, lines 1-15). Therefore, if there is a β in
Vk∈Q during recent view change, then in the first epoch after the view change the new primary either has to propose the relative
block for β or include 2f+1 negative responses in the first blockB that it proposes in the new view. If the primary fails to do so, a
view change will occur (throughE complaint).
5 Analysis and Formal Proofs
In this section we provide proofs for R-safety, S-safety and liveness properties for Hermes.
5.1 Safety
Hermes has relaxed the agreement (safety) condition. In Hermes a block is committed if at least f+1 correct nodes commit the
block. If 2f+1 nodes commit a block it is guaranteed that at least f+1 of these nodes are correct. Due to this relaxation in the
agreement condition the client also needs to wait for at least 2f+1Responsemessages for its transaction to consider it committed
(to make sure at least f+1 correct nodes have committed the block). For further client and network interaction including addressing,
client request de-duplication, censorship etc., we would defer to standard literature.
But it is also highly likely that Hermes holds stronger agreement condition where if a single correct node commits a block all
other correct nodes will eventually commit the same block at the same height (due to low probability of the primary as well as the
majority of nodes in C are Byzantine). For simplicity we useH as the set of all correct nodes such thatH⊆N and |H|≥2f+1 in the
proof of correctness.
Lemma 1. Hermes is R-safe during normal mode.
Proof. Consider two different blocksB andB′ with respective heights s and s′ where each block has been committed by at least
2f+1 nodes. It suffices to show that s 6=s′. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that during happy case execution (normal mode)
both B and B′ are committed at the same height (s=s′). Let K1⊆N be the set of nodes that commit B such that |K1|≥2f+1
and for each i∈K1, ψi(B,s)←true (all members ofK1 have committedB at height s). Similarly, letK2⊆N be the set of nodes that
commitB′ such that |K2|≥2f+1 and for each i∈K2, ψi(B′,s′)←true. Since n≥3f+1 and f <n/3, we get forK1∩K2=K that
|K|≥f+1. Hence,K∩H6=∅. Therefore, there is an i∈K∩H such that ψi(B,s)←true and ψi(B′,s′)←true (that is, i committed
both blocks). However, since i∈H, i can only commit one block at any specific sequence, and hence, it is impossible that i executed
both ψi(B,s)←true and ψi(B′,s′)←truewith s=s′ andB 6=B′. Therefore, s 6=s′, as needed.
Lemma 2. Hermes is R-safe during view change.
Proof. Consider the latest blockB′ at height s′ that was committed by at least 2f+1 nodes before the view change. We will show
thatB′ will be included in the blockchain history after the view change. LetHc⊆H be the set of honest nodes that have committed
B′ (that is, ψi(B′,s′)← true for each i∈Hc). Since the number of Byzantine nodes is f , we get that |Hc|≥f+1. At least a node
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i∈Hc must have reported a view change message Vi to the primary, such that Vi is aware ofB′ and s′. Since the primary node
collects 2f+1 view change messages intoQ, we get thatQ contains at least f+1 view change messages from the nodes inHwhere
at least one node is inHc too. Hence, when a node j receivesQ from the new primary, j will know thatB′ has been committed, a
guarantee thatB′ is valid. Thus, blockB′ will be inserted into the local history of every node that receivesQ, and becomes part of
the blockchain history.
Therefore, we get the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Under normal operation and a view change, Hermes provides relaxed safety guarantees (Hermes is R-safe).
Proof. From Lemmas 1 and 2 we obtain, Hermes provides relaxed safety guarantees (Hermes is R-safe) during normal mode as well
as view change mode.
Lemma 4. Hermes is S-safe during normal mode.
Proof. We will prove this lemma by contradiction. Let us assume that during normal mode at least one correct node (say, node i)
commits a block B at height s then we have ψi(B,s)← true. This means there exists a set K1⊆N such that |K1|≥ 2f+1 and
for each i∈K1, (ηi(B,s)←true) (all members ofK1 have confirmedB at height s). We also assume that there is another node j
that has committed a block B′ at height s′ such that s′= s (ψj(B′,s′)← true). Therefore, there is another set K2⊆N such that
|K2|≥2f+1 and for each i∈K2, (ηi(B′,s′)← true). Based on n≥3f+1 and f <n/3, we get K1∩K2 =K such that |K|≥f+1.
Hence,K∩H6=∅. Therefore, there is an i∈K∩H such that ηi(B,s)←true and ηi(B′,s′)←true (that is, i confirmed both blocks).
However, since i∈H, i can only confirm one block at any specific level (height) during normal mode, and hence, it is impossible
that i confirmed both ηi(B,s)←true and ηi(B′,s′)←truewith s=s′ andB 6=B′. Therefore, s 6=s′.
Lemma 5. Hermes is S-safe during view change if there is no equivocation fault.
Proof. Let us assume that a single node i has committed a block B at the height s (ψi(B,s)← true) just before the view change
occurs. That means there is a setK1⊆N such that |K1|≥2f+1 and for each i∈K1, (ηi(B,s)←true). Therefore during view change
there is another setK2⊆N such that |K2|≥2f+1 and for each i∈K2, Vi∈Q. As n≥3f+1, therefore we haveK1∩K2=K such
that |K|≥f+1. Thus,K∩H6=∅. Therefore, there is an i∈K∩H such that ηi(B,s)←true and Vi∈Q. Since Vi contains β for block
B, therefore the new primary has to re-propose blockB in the first epoch of the new view in the height s as show in Algorithm 1
lines 1-20.
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5.2 The equivocation Case
If the previous primary is malicious it can propose multiple blocks at the same height/sequence (just before the view change).
Suppose the malicious primary proposes two blocksB′ andB′′ before the view change such that one of these blocks (say, blockB′)
is committed by at most ξ number of nodes where ξ≤f . In such a case it is not guaranteed that a block committed by ξ nodes can
remain in the chain after the view change.
If 2f+1 view change messages received by the new primary (correct) include a view change message Vk by the node k that
contain the commit certificate (Approvemessage with 2f+1 signatures) for the blockB′ then it is guaranteed that the blockB′ will
be re-proposed in the next epoch for the same height (not be revoked). But if the new primary collects the view change messages
from another 2f+1 nodes (not the f nodes that committed the block) then the new primary might either propose B′ or B′′ in
the next epoch. Therefore it is not guaranteed that the blockB′ that has been committed by at most f nodes (at the height h) will
be re-proposed at the same height. This can happen because of the fact that out of these 2f+1 nodes included in theQ prepared
by the new primary at most f nodes can be Byzantine whereas at most another f might have received the blockB′′. At least one
node can have the blockB′. Therefore the new primary may receive two β messages, β′ (for blockB′) and β′′ (for blockB′′) from
the nodes in the view change message. The primary can re-propose any one of these blocks (B′ or B′′ for example) in the first
epoch of the new view (if found to be valid). If blockB′ is proposed then it is fine as this block is committed by at most f nodes.
But ifB′′ is proposed then the nodes that have committed the blockB′ will have to revoke the blockB′ and perform agreement on
the blockB′′ at the same height/sequence. BlockB′ can be proposed in the next epoch if there is no common transaction between
block B′ and B′′. If there is at least one common transaction among the blocks B′ and B′′ or some transactions in the block B′
are invalid the primary can extract valid transactions from the block B′ and propose them in another block. It should be noted
that in such case the malicious primary and its culprits in the C can be punished and their stake in the network can be slashed.
Lemma 6. It is highly unlikely that a Byzantine primary as well as impetus committee perform equivocation.
Proof. We prove this lemma three points. First the probability of performing equivocation by a Byzantine primary is low. Secondly,
it is expensive for a Byzantine primary to perform equivocation and third there is not enough incentive for a Byzantine primary to
perform equivocation as it will only cause processing delay in the network to recover from faults without affecting the client.
In order for an equivocation to take place the primary as well as the majority of nodes in the impetus committee C have to be
Byzantine. The probability of such an event with different values ofn and cused in Section 7 is between 0.00132 and 0.0027. For exam-
ple if on average the network has a view change once per week it will take 7 to 14 years for a primary as well as the C to be Byzantine
and be able to propose multiple blocks at the same height to the network. Additionally, the primary as well as the members of impetus
committee that are involved in equivocation will lose their stake in the network or can be blacklisted as described in subsection 3.1.
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As mentioned in the subsection 5.2, in case of equivocation if less than f+1 nodes have commit a block then this block might
get revoked. But it should also be noted that unlike other forking protocols (bitcoin, Ethereum etc) where a client has to wait for
the confirmation time to make sure the block it has accepted will not be revoked, this (revoking of block b) has no affect on the
client because a client will only consider a transaction in a specific block to be committed if and only if at least 2f+1 nodes in
the network commit that block. Thus, if a client considers a transaction to be committed then it has been committed by 2f+1
nodes or f+1 correct nodes and it will not be revoked (as shown in the Lemma 2). Therefore a Byzantine primary has no strong
incentive to perform equivocation as revoked transaction is not considered committed by the client (double spending attack is
impossible). As a result, it is unlikely that equivocation will take place in Hermes.
Theorem 7. It is highly likely that Hermes will hold S-safety.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemmas 4, 5 and 6.
5.3 Liveness
Hermes uses different means to provide liveness while keeping message complexity low (at O(cn) messages). As the main
communication among the nodes occur through the C, it is important that there must be at least one correct node in the C to
guarantee liveness. As shown in Section 3.2, the largest probability of total failure (for liveness) is 3.8·10−22 considering different
practical sizes of c and n that we have used in Section 7.
Another case that could potentially prevent liveness is when repeatedly selecting a bad C or malicious primary after a view
change, which in turn triggers another view change, and this perpetuates without termination. However, as we show next, this
extreme scenario may only occur with extremely low probability that fast approaches to 0. If the primary is malicious or the number
of malicious nodes in the impetus committee C is at least bc/2c+1, then based on Algorithm 2 (lines 36-40), and Algorithm 4 (lines
28-38), a view change may occur. The probability Pv of such a bad event causing a view change is approximately a constant 1/3
(Section 3).
Treating each such bad event as a Bernoulli trial, we have that the bad events trigger consecutively κ view changes with
probability at most Pκv , which fast approaches to 0 with exponential rate as κ increases linearly. Therefore, the probability of this
scenario is negligible and does not affect liveness.
Additionally, view change in Hermes also employ three techniques applied by the PBFT [5]. These techniques include: (1)
exponential backoff timer for view change; (2) at least f+1 complaints will cause a view change. This technique has been customized
in Hermes with additional phases as described in 4.3. The first phase that has been added to Hermes include broadcastingConfV
messages to regular nodes by impetus committee. The second phase include aggregation of at least 2f+1ConfV messages by
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Fig. 5: Throughput with different network sizes when
all nodes have higher bandwidth
Fig. 6: Latency with different network sizes when
all nodes have higher bandwidth
the members of C intoApproveV message and broadcasting it to regular nodes. These additional steps are added to make sure
that at least 2f+1 replicas are aware of view change. And (3) faulty nodes (f <n/3) cannot trigger a view change.
It should be noted that even during a view change the performance of Hermes will not be affected by the slack primary. This
is because the primary will send its message to the impetus committee and the impetus committee will forward primary’s message
to regular nodes. Therefore view change messages from primary will propagate proportional to the wire speed of prompt nodes.
6 Efficient Optimistic Responsiveness
Pipelining is an optimization technique that involves sending requests/messages back to back without waiting for their confirmation.
This technique has been previously used in networking [27] as well as in consensus [17], [28] to improve performance. Therefore, as
optimization the primary can propose a new blockB′ with sequence s after Pre−Proposal phase for blockB with sequence s−1
without waiting for the blockB to get committed. The primary can wait only for majority of votes from the impetus committee
to propose a new block. This technique decreases the wait time for the primary to propose next block while making sure that
with high probability the protocol will make progress.
For safety condition to hold we need to replace β withAβ, whereAβ is an array of β in V iewChangemessage V . As in basic
Hermes the primary proposes the next block after it commits its parent block. There will be only one valid pending block in the
network with β. But in case of pipelined Hermes, Since the primary proposes a block after Pre−Proposal phase of its parent,
by the end of timeout a node might receive multiple uncommitted blocks. Therefore, the information about latest uncommitted
blocks has to be included inAβ during the view change.
For state machine replication (SMR) in blockchains sending Pre−proposal message, Confirm message and committing a
block duringApproval phase has to be done in order (serially) for each block. This means a node iwill not confirm blockB at the
sequence s (ηi(B,s)←true) before blockB′ with the sequence s′ such that s>s′. Out of order messages can be cached. But other
operations including signature verification and format checking can be done concurrently.
We leave more details on this to programmers who will be going to implement this protocol.
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Fig. 7: Throughput when a slack primary is introduced Fig. 8: Latency when a slack primary is introduced
7 Evaluations
We have implemented prototype of optimized Hermes as well as chained Hotstuff [17] (pipelined) using Golang programming
language. We chose pipelined Hotstuff as it is a state-of-the-art consensus protocol. A variant of Hotstuff called Libra-BFT [29] is
also used by Facebook. We implemented Hotstuff to keep similar code architecture with Hermes so that we can fairly compare both
algorithms.
Experiments were conducted in the Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud. Each node in the network was represented by an
instance of type t2.large in AWS. Each t2.large instance has 2 virtual CPU (cores) and 8GB of memory. We recorded performance
of Hermes as well as Hotsuff with network sizes of 40, 70, 100, 130, 160 and 190 nodes. The impetus committee size c for each
network size n are 18, 27, 30, 33, 34 and 36 respectively. We adjusted values of n and c so that we can obtain the maximum failure
probability of Pf≤3.8×10−22 using Equation 1.
Randomly generated transactions were used during experiments to transfer funds among different accounts. Transactions were
included in a block (batch). We used different block sizes of 1MB, 2MB and 3MB.
During our first evaluation all nodes had similar upload and download bandwidth of 1Gbps 128MBps. During our tests as
shown in Figure 5 Hotstuff performs better with small network size (40 and 70). This is due to the reason that when n is small,
c (c < n) has to be larger to maintain a safe failure probability. Therefore, as the network size n grows larger the growth of c
remains sub linear to the growth nwhile keeping safe failure probability. As a result, with larger nHermes performs better and its
performance is comparable to the performance of HotStuff. Whereas, in terms of latency as shown in Figure 6, Hermes outperforms
the Hotstuff. As it can be seen, Hermes has lower latency than the Hotstuff and variation in the latency of Hermes and Hotstuff
with different block sizes of 2MB and 3MB grow larger when n>70.
Next we introduced slack primaries and then compared the performance of Hermes and Hotstuff as shown in Figure 7 and
Figure 8. We configured the upload speed of slack primary to 82Mbps (roughly equivalent to 10MBps). We reduced block size to 1
MB and 2 MB as with block size of 3MB we were experiencing very high latency and packet drops. As it can be seen in Figure 7
the throughput lead of Hermes grows from more than two times (when n=40) to four times when block size is 1MB and to 4.8
times when block size is 2MB (with n=190). Similarly, Figure 8 shows that the latency of Hotstuff grows very fast with increase in
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network size when primary is slack.
8 RelatedWork
The most relevant work to our protocol is Proteus [13] in which the primary proposes block to a subset of nodes called root
committee. But after confirmation from the root committee the primary proposes the block to all nodes which we have avoided
in Hermes. Proteus has only focused on improving the message complexity. Moreover, the probability of view change in Proteus
is higher (0.5) compared to Hermes (0.3) as the primary is chosen from the impetus committee. Proteus is only R-Safe whereas
Hermes is R-safe and highly likely S-safe. To be S-safe Hermes has additional recovery phase during its view change sub protocol.
Proteus holds responsiveness but is not efficiently optimistic responsive whereas Hermes is efficiently optimistic responsive.
Random selection of subset of nodes in a BFT committee has also been used inAlgorand [14], Consensus Through Herding [30],
[15] and [16]. Algorand is a highly scalable BFT based protocol, but can tolerate 20 percent of Byzantine nodes in the network while
providing probabilistic safety (depending on the size of committee and number of Byzantine nodes in the network). Consensus
Through Herding [30] achieve consensus in poly-logarithmic number of rounds. In [15], [16] protocols achieves Byzantine Agreement
(BA) with sublinear round complexity under corrupt majority. All of these protocols operate in Synchronous environment under
adaptive adversarial model. On the contrary, Hermes can operate in asynchronous environment and does not consider adaptive
adversarial model.
Hot-stuff [17] is another BFT-based protocol linear message complexityO(n). Hot-stuff has abolished the view change mode
with the cost of an additional round of message complexity in normal mode. In Hot-stuff there can be multiple forks before the block
gets committed. When a block gets committed, the blocks in its competitive forks will be revoked. This effectively causes wastage of
resources (bandwidth, processing power etc.) that were consumed in proposing the revoked blocks. As the primary is changed with
each block proposal, at most there can be bn/3c−1 failed epochs (where no blocks are generated) out of n epochs. The rotating
primary mechanism of Hotstuff cannot resolve the problem of slack primary. Because if there are ns slack nodes. Then at least ns
times there will be sudden degradation in protocol performance due to slack primary. This results in inconsistent performance.
Libra-BFT is [29] based on Hotstuff, but its synchronization module that is used to recover missing blocks has O(n2) message
complexity.
There has been another line of work presented in PRIME [31], Aavardak [32] and RBFT [33]. In these papers the authors have
tried to address the performance attack (delaying proposal) by Byzantine primary by monitoring primary performance. In case of
failing the expectation, primary is replaced by the network. But in their model, they have not considered the slack but honest nodes.
That means slack primaries will also be treated as a Byzantine primary and will be replaced. Moreover, even a prompt primary
might get replaced due to network glitch. This will result in higher number of expensive but unnecessary view changes. Moreover,
if Proof-of-Stake (PoS) is used over BFT, then an honest but slack primary will seldom get chance to propose a block, hence will not
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be able to increase its stake regularly causing centralization of stake to prompt nodes. Furthermore, unlike Hermes these solutions
do not address combination of problems which include message complexity, latency, and slack primary problem. Hermes does not
consider addressing the Byzantine primary performance attack but performance monitoring module from these proposal can be
added to Hermes to address this issue.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a highly efficient BFT-based consensus protocol for blockchains which addresses the problem of slack
primary. Furthermore, this protocol has lower latency and message complexity. We also show that breaking strong safety in Hermes
is unlikely and expensive for Byzantine primary. Breaking strong safety will only cause additional processing delay and will not
result in double spending attack. Therefore, a Byzantine primary has no incentive to perform such attack. As a result the safety of
Hermes is comparable to the safety of general BFT-based protocols.
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